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ABSTRACT
The article is devoted to the discussion on fin de siècle in the context of 
the trajectory the modernity took in the twentieth century Russia. The 
author follows C. Castoriadis’ definition of modernity through double 
imaginary of autonomy and rational mastery as well as P. Wagner’s 
characterisation of modernity as experience and interpretation. He 
demonstrates how in Russian constellation of modernity autonomy 
came to be understood as a secondary to rational mastery and how 
collective autonomy started to dominate over individual one. For this 
purpose, he discusses details of N. Federov’s “Philosophy of the 
Common Task” as well as peculiarities of the development of Russian 
society of the beginning of the last century. Then M. Khomyakov turns 
to the contemporary fin de siècle and discusses what he sees as a 
major crisis of modernity in general and democracy, in particular. Thus, 
the article interprets fin de siècles as inherent to the modernity crises, 
the main elements of which are revising, reinterpretation, reformulation 
and renegotiation of the modernity’s fundamentals.
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Introduction
The centenary of Russian October Revolution has revitalized discussions on 
the role of this catastrophic event in the trajectory of Russian modernity and, at 
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the same time, raised question on the role of the peculiar cultural phenomenon 
of the end of XIX – beginning of XX century, the fin de siècle. It is obviously 
tightly connected with a number of social catastrophes of the beginning of 
XX century, of which Russian Revolution was, probably, one of the most 
significant events. One of the interesting questions, then, is how the October 
Revolution is intertwined with the cultural phenomena of fin de siècle and 
how they all influenced the trajectories, Russian modernity took afterwards.
 Another, equally interesting question is what these phenomena and events 
mean for the present fin de siècle we are arguably living through in the beginning 
of XXI century. How do the issues we face today relate to our experience, and 
how is general disorientation of the contemporary world connected with the 
disorientation of the end of XIX century? These questions are, obviously, not only 
about the ways of Russian modernity or about Russian re-interpretation of the 
world, but also of more general philosophical kind – on the relations between 
fin de siècle and modernity as such. Of course, we cannot expect to address all 
these questions here fully; it would be more than enough just to ask them properly. 
 Fin de siècle is often seen through the history “of conflicting narratives and 
trajectories” (Marshall, 2007, p. 3). It is also sometimes considered as connected to 
the finis seculi, the end of the (old) world or fin du globe (Oscar Wild), as a kind of the 
apocalypse’s rehearsal. It is not accidental, then, that Russian philosophers of this time 
saw similar rehearsal in really apocalyptic events of the October Revolution. For Nikolai 
Berdyaev, for example, “the meaning of the revolution is internal apocalypse of the history. 
Apocalypse is not only revelation of the end of the world, of the Last Judgment. It is also 
revelation of the constant proximity of the end inside of the history itself…” (Berdyaev, 
1990, p. 107). The concepts of apocalypse, of fin de siècle and of revolution, thus, seem 
to be tightly interconnected. The apocalyptic interpretation of the fin de siècle, on the 
one hand, archetypically refers to old religious millenarist expectations, but, on the other 
hand, reveals apocalyptic character of the modernity itself. The questions asked above, 
therefore, are inseparable from the question on the catastrophic nature of modernity.
 Interestingly, some scholars find striking parallelism between fin de siècle of XIX 
century and our own time, thus generalizing on the recurrence of this phenomenon. 
In this way Elaine Showalter explains this parallelism and recurrence with the 
psychological assumption that “the crises of the fin de siècle … are more intensely 
experienced, more emotionally fraught, more weighted with symbolic and historical 
meaning, because we invest them with the metaphors of death and rebirth that we 
project onto the final decades and years of a century” (Showalter, 1990, p. 1). Putting 
aside the implausibility of this explanation, the parallelism is noticeable and not only 
between 1890s and 1990s, but also 1960s, which fact enabled Terry Eagleton to claim 
that “the fin de siècle arrived earlier this century” (Eagleton, 1995, p. 11). 1990s and 
1890s are parallel in many things, except politics; the end of the twentieth century 
seems to have forgot about class, state, imperialism and modes of production. This 
forgetfulness is explained by the crisis of the alternative Soviet form of modernity. 
Thus, for Eagleton “what we seem left with in the nineties, then, is something of 
the culture of the previous fin de siècle shorn of its politics” (Eagleton, 1995, p. 11).
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 If we put aside ungrounded psychological or theological speculations, the 
parallelism still requires explanation. Why fin de siècle is recurrent, if not because 
of internal apocalypse of the history or because of the psychologically acute 
perception of the crises in the light of the end of the century? What does it mean 
for the history? How the cultural phenomena are connected with social and political 
catastrophes so characteristic for any fin de siècle? This article will make an 
attempt to outline a very general view of a possible approach to this theme. On the 
reasons, which will soon become clear, I believe, however, that even most general 
view here cannot be given in abstraction from the real time and space that is from 
the real history of real people. That is why a large part of this text will be devoted 
to the real fin de siècle: of Russian pre-revolutionary and revolutionary society, 
which, we hope, is a good illustration to the main general thesis of this article.
 We will start, then, with a general description of the linkage between modernity 
and fin de siècle. This description, being necessarily abstract and theoretical in the 
beginning, is a hypothesis, which will be empirically grounded later. In our description, 
we are going to base our considerations on the theory of modernity as experience 
and interpretation as it can be found in recent writings of Peter Wagner (Wagner, 
2008). Then we will have a closer look at Russian fin de siècle to locate a starting 
point for the trajectory Russian version of modernity took afterwards. Finally, we 
will try to briefly address the question on the current fin de siècle, which has been 
arguably accompanied with almost as catastrophic events as those of the fin de 
siècle one hundred years ago. Since the main task of this article is describing the 
questions and laying the problems, the conclusions will necessarily be modest.
Fin de siècle in the trajectories of modernity
After Johann Arnason’s and Peter Wagner’s seminal works on modernity (Arnason, 
1989; Wagner, 1994) it has become almost a commonplace to refer to Cornelius 
Castoriadis’s characterization of modernity as based upon a certain “double 
imaginary signification”. Namely, the modern period, according to Castoriadis, “is 
best defined by the conflict, but also the mutual contamination and entanglement, 
of two imaginary significations: autonomy on the one hand, unlimited expansion of 
‘rational mastery’, on the other. They ambiguously coexisted under the common roof 
of ‘reason’” (Castoriadis, 1997, pp. 37–38). Arnason thinks of these two principles, 
or, rather, “significations” as having divergent, mutually irreducible logics so that “the 
pursuit of the unlimited power over nature does not necessarily enhance the capacity 
of human society to question and reshape its own institutions, and a coherent vision 
of the autonomous society excludes an unquestioning commitment to the more or 
less rationalized phantasm of total mastery” (Arnason, 1989, p. 327). These logics, 
however, are not only divergent, but also “entangled”, and both are present in 
modernity from its very outset (Carlenden, 2010, p. 57). In short, “modernity has two 
goals – to make man master and possessor of nature, and to make human freedom 
possible. The question that remains is whether these two are compatible with one 
another” (Gillespie, 2008, p. 42).
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 Importantly, these two pillars of modernity are not definite principles; they are 
rather significations, in other words, “multiform complexes of meaning that give rise to 
more determinate patterns and at the same time remain open to other interpretations” 
(Arnason, 1989, p. 334). The interpretations are given and the definite patters are 
formed, in their turn, in real historical situations by real people, and thus reflect 
complex interplay of different elements, including other imaginary significations, pre-
modern traditions, popular sentiments or political considerations. The question of 
how these patterns are formulated against a particular socio-historical background 
is, then, one of the most important and interesting questions arising in the study of 
modernity. This is how we understand here the question of the trajectories of modernity.
 These trajectories are determined by particular constellations of autonomy and 
mastery, defined by the current interpretations of them, which are formed, in its turn, 
on the basis of previous experiences of modernity. However, if autonomy and rational 
mastery, freedom and control are conflicting but entangled significations, their relations 
unavoidably go through a number of crises, in which the experiences are re-evaluated, 
the concepts are re-interpreted and the constellations are re-made. In other words, 
modernity seems to require revolutions during which the very basics of the society 
are revisited and new world-interpretations are formed, which, in their turn become 
foundations for the new experiences. Or, as Peter Wagner puts it, “… the experience 
with the application of a specific concept leads to processes of reinterpretation. Socio-
political change is not least based on conceptual reinterpretation” (Wagner, 2016, p. 11).
 To understand this dynamics fully, however, we need to consider briefly relations 
between the main elements, which define the constellations of modernity. Now, on the 
one hand, autonomy as auto-nomy that is as a capacity of giving oneself one’s own 
laws, consists in overcoming the boundaries, which are necessary for exercising the 
rational mastery. On the other hand, being a capacity of self-determination, autonomy is 
also about obeying the self-imposed laws, and thus, about reproducing the boundaries 
and frameworks. The picture will become more complex if we add here the distinction 
between individual and collective autonomy. If for the individual, the boundaries 
are given in the capacities of his/her physical body widened to some extent by the 
technology, the collectivity does not have any pre-existing boundaries and should be 
historically formed. Therefore, the very notion of collective autonomy includes some 
inherent concept of the boundaries, defined through complex exclusion – inclusion 
interplay. Moreover, if social outcome of the exercise of many individual autonomous 
wills is very uncertain, the mastery of the situation might call for the exercise of rich 
collective autonomy with its own collective intentionality (see, for example, Wagner, 
2016, pp. 98–101). In other words, any particular constellation of modernity is based 
at least on some interpretation of the relations between collective and individual 
autonomy as well as between autonomy and mastery, between emancipation 
and domination or between transcending the boundaries and laying them…
Thus, changing of the constellations is necessarily connected with re-negotiating 
new compromise, forming new boundaries and re-interpreting foundational concepts. 
Revolution is, of course, the most radical, catastrophic expression of such re-
negotiation. In old Lenin’s definition of the “revolutionary situation” it is characterized 
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by the impossibility for “the tops” to dominate in the old way and by the unwillingness 
of “the bottoms” to live in the old fashion (Lenin, 1969, p. 218). Revolution, then, 
happens when the old frameworks of domination (or mastery) hinder autonomy from 
its realization, and, thus, are re-interpreted as enabling heteronomy and un-freedom. 
Active entrepreneurial revolutionary minority (such as Bolsheviks in 1917) can 
grasp this moment, gain the power and political coup d’état crowns the revolution.
 What is more important and more fundamental, however, is exactly the re-
interpretation of the main concepts. Old constellations are reinterpreted as hindering 
autonomy (while before they were seen as enabling freedom), and new constellations 
based upon reinterpreted concepts are negotiated. This intense process is accompanied 
by revisiting (and reinterpreting) collective memory: founding historical moments, 
personalities and experiences. In result a new world-interpretation is formed as a 
framework for the new experiences. Thus, the revisiting, reinterpretation, reformulation 
and renegotiation are the most basic elements of the social change, of which revolution 
is just one, most radical expression. Cultural phenomenon of fin de siècle, thus, is more 
fundamental than social or political revolution. It is indispensible for the modernity.
 The history of modernity, then, is a history of consensuses and various 
constellations with the ruptures of the transformation moments of fin de siècle. It is clear 
therefore why for the father of Russian social democracy, Alexander Herzen fin de siècle 
started in 1848, and for the European New Left – in 1968. Fin de siècle of XIX century, 
being one of the most radical transformations of the modernity, only contingently, then, 
coincided with the calendar end of the century and gained millenarist and somehow 
mystical interpretation. An interesting question for the history of modernity is, however, 
which particular constellation became the result of one or another fin de siècle, and 
how it defined experience of modernity afterwards… These are the questions we 
should ask both on Russian fin de siècle of XIX century and on our present times.
Autonom(ies) and mastery of Russian fin de siècle in XIX century
The experience of modernity of Russian society of XVIII–XIX centuries was anything 
but unproblematic. And one of the main peculiar Russian problems of this period was 
conceptualized as a radical divide between what in 1860s became known as the 
intelligentsia and peasant traditional Orthodox “people”. The divide was one of the 
results of the swift installation of modernity on Russian soil in XVII–XVIII centuries.
 To cut very long history short, Peter the Great’s reforms created Russian European 
nobility, who have been perceived as living in Russia like in a foreign colony. This 
unfortunate divide persisted throughout the nineteenth century. The noble “European” 
stratum, however, was gradually widening and in the 1860s it started to include 
lower classes, mostly sons of the clergy, to form a peculiar social phenomenon: a 
rationalistic intelligentsia. Although they started to talk and to write Russian (before this 
time French was the main language of the nobility), their rationalistic mindset differed 
greatly from the Orthodox mysticism of their own fathers and of the majority of the 
peasant population.
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 In different times, the basic cleavage of Russian society has been conceptualized 
differently: as the East-West contradiction, as the Orthodoxy-rational science 
divide, and so on, but it is the “intelligentsia-people (narod)” opposition that became 
the idèe fixe for all Russian literature. Thus, the famous Russian Husserlian 
philosopher, Gustav Shpet (1879–1937), described this problem of Russia as the 
main problem of Russian philosophy: “the ‘people’, and the ‘intelligentsia’ as the 
creative spokesman of the people, are related to one another both philosophically 
and culturally. Russian philosophy approaches its problem of Russia as the problem 
of the relations of the above-mentioned terms, sometimes from the side of ‘the 
people’, sometimes from the side of the ‘intelligentsia’, but always solves the only 
problem, the problem of the relation itself. The difference and even opposition 
of the answers – sub specie of the people and sub specie of the intelligentsia – 
defines the peculiar dialectics of Russian philosophy…” (Shpet, 2008, p. 76).
 Internal and external divides reinforced each other: those critical of Western 
Europe also wanted to correct the excesses of Russian Enlightenment and to 
find a specific Russian way in modern civilization; those who thought of the West 
as the best implementation of modern civilization naturally wanted to finish what 
Peter the Great had only started and to “westernize” the whole country. The split 
itself, however, has always been understood as a symptom of a deadly disease of 
Russian culture. Westernizers of the early nineteen century saw the nature of this 
illness in the ignorance and backwardness of the people, while Slavophiles of the 
time interpreted the divide as a deadly split between borrowed Enlightenment and 
original Russian life. One of the fathers of Slavophilism, Alexey Khomyakov, in his 
article of 1845 called this borrowed science “colonial” (Khomyakov, 1900, p. 24) 
and vehemently condemned its discord with the life that had created great Russia 
“long before foreign science came to gild its tops” (Khomyakov, 1900, p. 22). Being 
a follower of Schelling and an admirer of Britain, Khomyakov, however, thought that 
scholarship (especially in the social sciences and humanities) must correspond to 
the life of the nation, must be of the same roots, so to speak. The absence of such 
correspondence leads to a situation in which “there was knowledge in the upper 
classes, but this knowledge was absolutely remote from life; there was life in the lower 
classes, but this life never rose to consciousness” (Khomyakov, 1900, p. 22). This split 
was the primary object of analysis for Russian philosophy and sociology, and arguably 
became one of the reasons for the radical reinterpretation of Russian fin de siècle.
 Now, after 1860s in the majority of the discussions the main characteristic of 
intelligentsia has been seen in the rationality of the educated class, in the “positive 
science” it supposedly masters (in contrast to the traditional orthodox religiosity of 
“the people”). In the most radical circles science, thus, was increasingly perceived 
as a kind of panacea, a kind of the instrument for perfect mastery – both over nature 
and over society. It is rationality and science, which dominated the discussion. The 
questions of justice, moral issues as well as social problems were to be solved by 
rational mastery of science. Radical Russian intelligentsia even tried to derive the 
whole of morality from positive rationality; not from Kantian rational transcendental 
self, but – paradoxically – from natural science and evolutionary biology. Famous 
226 Maxim Khomyakov
Russian philosopher and one of the fathers of Russian fin de siècle, Vladimir Soloviev 
reportedly described Russian intelligentsia as guided by a strange syllogism: “all 
people descended from the monkey; therefore we must love each other” (Berdyaev, 
1989, p. 168). Thus, of two modernity’s imaginary significations, autonomy and 
the mastery, it is the second that was increasingly getting dominance in Russian 
discussions of XIX century. Formal freedom, autonomy was the object for discussion 
much more rarely. It has been often assumed, as we will see, that the perfect scientific 
mastery will finally free human beings, make them truly autonomous. In XX century, 
this trend found its perfect implementation in the idea of “scientific communism”…
 The “educated” worship of science and the “uneducated” worship of God were 
to be united somehow to solve the main Russian question of the XIX century. These 
attempts powered Russian fin de siècle (including arts and literature), influenced 
October revolution, and, finally determined the particular form Russian modernity took 
in XX century. Thus, the same Vladimir Soloviev in a letter to the editor of the Journal 
Voprosy Philosohii I Psychologii, Prof. N.Y. Grot, described his own early philosophical 
development as an attempt to reconcile the “existence of plesiosaurs” with “the true 
worship of God” (Soloviev, 1914, p. 270; also see Lukyanov, 1916, pp. 117–120).
 Theologically speaking, this was a question of creating a new Christian 
apologetics, of the possibility of uniting western science and Russian Orthodoxy, 
and thus, of reconciliation in the “philosophy of all-unity” (as Soloviev called his 
theory) the “people” with the “intelligentsia”, and the West with the East. Similarly to 
the social question, which could be answered either from the side of the “people” 
or from the side of the “intelligentsia”, the apologetic issue could be solved either 
sub specie of Orthodoxy or sub specie of science. What almost all Russian fin de 
siècle philosophers sought, anyway, was a reconciliation of science and religion.
 These characteristics of Russian fin de siècle found their peculiar implementation 
in the works of one of the most original philosophers of this time, Nikolay Fedorov (1829–
1903). This odd personality in spite of his unwillingness to publish his works had a great 
impact upon Russian and Soviet culture of the twentieth century. Among those who were 
influenced by his views we can count Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Solovyev, Mayakovski, 
Khlebnikov, Stravinsky, Platonov, Pasternak etc.; his ideas became the basis for a 
number of ideological movements, such as Eurasianism (Evraziystvo), cosmism, 
immortalism, hyperboreanism, etc. This surprising success of Fedorov’s strange ideas 
is partly explained by the fact that he managed to give an answer to the question of 
Russia in a distinctly modern and, at the same time, a peculiarly Russian way. There is 
no place here to discuss Fedorov’s theories in details, but some description of his ideas is 
necessary to demonstrate the way Russian society tried to find its own path in modernity.
 In George M. Young’s characterization, “Fedorov … was simultaneously a 
futuristic visionary of unsurpassed boldness and an archconservative spokesman 
for ideas usually branded reactionary, a man with a twenty-first century mind and a 
medieval heart” (Young, 2012, p. 10). It is not surprising, then, that he produced a 
theory that seemed to be able to transcend all contradictions of the present world, 
and to lead humankind toward a better future. Fedorov himself calls his theory “a 
philosophy of the common task” and prefers to name it a “project”. His purpose is not to 
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explain the nature of things, but to transform the world. As he puts it, the main question 
of philosophy is not why existing things exist, but why “living beings suffer and die” 
(Fedorov, 1906, p. 296).
 Now, any “project” has three main elements: (1) a description of the state of 
affairs (the-world-as-it-is), (2) a description of the desired condition (the-world-as-
it-ought-to-be), and (3) a description of the way from the first to the second, from 
the reality to the ideal. And Fedorov, trying to offer a new projectivist philosophy, 
does organize it in this three-fold way. “Science should not be the knowledge 
of the causes without the knowledge of the goal, should not be the knowledge of 
the primary causes without the knowledge of the final causes (that is knowledge 
for the sake of knowledge, knowledge without action)…” (Fedorov, 1982, p. 66).
 The state of affairs is described as the slavery of humanity, as its absolute 
dependence upon the blind forces of nature. This dependence is evident, for example, in 
various natural disasters, such as periodic famines, the last of which in Russia of Fedorov’s 
time happened in 1891 (Fedorov, 1982, p. 58). The main evidence of this dependence, 
however, is death itself as the inescapable destiny of all living beings. This is the vicious 
blind circle of birth and death, which, according to Fedorov, makes the current condition 
of humanity intolerable. Nature, then, is the first and the main enemy of humanity, 
which, however, can become a friend. It is “a power as long as we are powerless… 
This power is blind as long as we are unreasonable, as long as we do not represent its 
reason… Nature is for us a temporary enemy, but eternal friend, since there is no eternal 
enmity, the elimination of the temporary one is our task…” (Fedorov, 1982, p. 521).
 Interestingly, Fedorov describes this condition in terms of the progress, thus, 
thinking of the progress itself as of the blind force of the nature to be eliminated through 
the joint efforts of humankind. In biology progress consists “in the devourment of the 
elder by the younger”, in sociology it is the “attainment of the largest possible measure 
of freedom … (and not participation of each person in the common task)”. In short, 
“while stagnation is death, and regress is not a paradise either, progress is the true 
Hell, and a truly Divine, a truly Human task consists in the salvation of the victims of 
progress, in guiding them from Hell” (Fedorov, 1982, pp. 77–78). This description of the 
progress strangely reminds us of Walter Benjamin’s image of progress as a destructing 
storm, which is piling debris in front of the eyes of the backward-looking angel of history 
(Benjamin, 1969, p. 257; Wagner, 2016, pp. 102–103). According to Federov, progress 
is destruction only because it is natural, “blind” actor of history. Perfect mastery, thus, is 
mastery over the progress as well as over all other natural forces.
 As far as internal human nature is concerned, it is imperfect and blind partly 
because humans are born as animals. Birth is, thus, the other side of death and 
should be eliminated together with death and the condition of progress. Only 
God, being causa sui, is immortal. That is why, according to Fedorov, the main 
path for humanity to God-like immortality is literal self-creation from dead matter.
 Human society is no exception, since it is also dominated by the inimical blind 
forces of nature. This domination is evident in what Fedorov calls the un-brotherhood 
(nebratstvo) and discord (rozn’) of contemporary society. Since “history as a fact” is 
a permanent bellum omnium contra omnes, a “mutual extermination” (Fedorov, 1982, 
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p. 202), “there would be no meaning in the history of humankind as long as history 
… is not our action, is not a product of our joint reason and will, as long as it is an 
unconscious and involuntary phenomenon” (Fedorov, 1982, p. 197).
 Thus, for Fedorov the-world-as-it-is is characterized by the domination of the blind 
forces of nature. It pertains to the external world, to internal human nature and to the 
current condition of society. This world, being an “existing Hell”, must be transformed 
by the joint efforts of all human beings. Now, in order to complete his “philosophy of 
common task”, Fedorov had to picture also the-world-as-it-ought-to-be, the world-in-
project, the Paradise humankind must aspire to.
 This ideal world is pictured by Christianity. Fedorov considered himself an 
Orthodox thinker and thought that his theory fulfilled the promises and followed the 
aspirations of Orthodoxy, despite the deeply promethean spirit of this theory. He did 
not want to build the new world without God; on the contrary, he thought that God 
himself wanted humankind to fulfill the “common task”. Fedorov interprets almost all 
the contents of Christianity in this new, “projectivist” way, as a call for humankind to 
join in the task of “regulating nature”. As one of his disciples explains: “Propagation of 
life, immortality and resurrection is the essence of the Saviour’s teaching. He calls His 
Heavenly Father ‘God of Fathers’, that is of the dead, but at the same time also ‘not 
the God of the dead, but of the living’ (Mark 12:26-27), that is, of those who are going 
to return to life, of those who will resuscitate; since ‘God has not created death’… and 
desires ‘all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth’ (1 Tim 2:4)” 
(Kozhevnikov, 1908, p. 273).
 Contemporary Christianity, however, is too contaminated with paganism, 
the main evidence of which is its “passive” character. Even Russian Orthodoxy, 
the closest to the true Christian religion, according to Fedorov, transformed 
commandments into dogmata, and created rites out of tasks. The right interpretation 
of Christianity, then, is to re-interpret all dogmata as commandments, and 
all rites as tasks. For Fedorov all of them point toward one single project – 
the project of the “regulation of nature” and of the resurrection of the dead.
 Science, art and religion are to be united in the project of resurrection. Or, as 
George M. Young explains it: “the scientific projects cannot be understood in isolation 
from the religious, political, sociological, artistic, and economic projects. In contrast to 
some of his followers, Fedorov repeatedly emphasizes that technological advance, 
if pursued independently from advances in morality, the arts, government, and 
spirituality, and if pursued for its own sake or for purposes other than the resurrection 
of the ancestors, could end only in disaster. And further … he believed that spiritual 
development alone, without scientific technology, could also lead only to a dead end” 
(Young, 2012, p. 50).
 Now, the picture of “the-world-as-it-ought-to-be” or “the world-in-the-project” is 
quite clear: this is the world, guided or “regulated” by united humankind. Humanity 
must fully dominate nature; it should regulate the movements of not only all stars 
and planets in outer space, but also of all the smallest particles of the matter. Such 
humans are not mortal anymore; they have finally defeated their main enemy and 
become immortal and omnipotent. “The common task”, however, consists not only 
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in achieving immortality for one generation. For Fedorov, this would have been 
appallingly immoral. Humankind, in Fedorov’s project, is united across generations, all 
to be resurrected by fellow humans, or, rather, by the sons and daughters of the dead. 
“Universal resurrection is a full victory over space and time. The transfer ‘from the earth 
to heaven’ is a victory … over space (or successive omnipresence). The transfer from 
death to life or simultaneous coexistence of the whole series of times (generations), 
coexistence of succession, is a triumph over time” (Fedorov, 1982, p. 572).
 Now, if such is the ideal, how might it be realized? Since blind forces of nature 
bring death not because they are evil in themselves, but exactly because they are 
blind, humanity’s path to salvation is, for Fedorov, in regulating those forces. Thus, 
first, sexuality should be reversed and directed to the dead parents; it must become, 
so to speak, the main resurrecting force. Or, as Fedorov himself puts it, “resurrection 
is replacement of the lust of birth with conscious re-creation” (Fedorov, 1982, p. 81). 
This will transform human society into a society of the sons and daughters, working 
together on the resurrection of dead. Such a society has one purpose, one task, which 
is really common, and this task transcends all private particularity of interests and 
desires. This truly totalitarian society of brothers and sisters eliminates discord and, 
thus, stops permanent war. Together with the force of sexual attraction, the force of 
natural selection loses its grip on human beings. Similarly to sexuality, however, this 
force should not be eliminated, but rather re-directed against the common enemy of 
humankind. Armies, then, must be converted into troops, fighting nature.
 This society is, of course, a matter of the very distant future. Fedorov describes it in 
daring and fantastic language, but rejects going into details about its possibility. “Earth and 
then other planets, being created from cosmic dust, will create under the management of 
the reasonable beings from the same cosmic dust conductors of the force from the sun… 
Through these conductors… Earth and other planets … will accelerate or decelerate the 
movement of the whole system. The assemblage of worlds, inspired by the resurrected 
generations in their close brotherly union, will itself be the instrument of the resurrection 
of their predecessors, the fathers” (Fedorov, 1982, p. 527).
 Fedorov’s philosophy is, undoubtedly, one of the brightest, most bizarre 
and most peculiarly Russian theories, which emerged during the fin de 
siècle. It has a number of very distinct features that helped it to attract a 
number of adherents in twentieth century Russia. These features also help 
us to reconstruct the way it paved to modernity for several next generations.
 First, this philosophy unites science and religion in a very peculiar way, thus 
reconciling Soloviev’s plesiosaurs with God’s worship. Fedorov emphasizes this unity 
in almost all questions of importance. For him, the “common task” is “positivism in 
the sphere of final causes (Fedorov, 1982, p. 85). However oxymoronic this idea 
might seem, Fedorov managed to create an ideology, which became quite popular 
both among Orthodox Christian thinkers and among communists of the 1920s. In 
Fedorov’s theory science and Orthodoxy are at times kept separate (with science 
providing tools for the attainment of religious goals), but at times they are fused 
in the most uncritical way, so that science is treated religiously and vice versa. 
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This peculiar fusion of religion and science can also be easily discovered in the 
Russian communism of the twentieth century (see, for example, Berdyaev, 1990).
 Secondly, Fedorov, interpreting the separation of the “learned” from the 
“unlearned” as the main cause of the “un-brotherhood” and “discord” of the society, 
gives his own answer to the Russian question on the re-unification of the “intelligentsia” 
and the “people”. This answer is reunification in action, a practical unification. The goal 
of universal salvation for Fedorov is so powerful that it is able to heal this wound of 
Russian modernity. Obviously, the communists acted in a similar fashion: the eminence 
of their goal helped them to mobilize very different groups in the society.
 Thirdly, and relatedly, in the divide between the Slavophiles and Westernizers, 
Fedorov occupies the middle ground. He describes Russia in distinctly messianic 
terms, but values Western science and technology greatly. Importantly also, his 
Russian messianism is not exclusivist or chauvinistic: he thinks that Russia would be 
the first to take up the task, which must be, however, a common task for the whole of 
humankind. As George M. Young comments: “Fedorov and the Cosmists eventually 
offer a synthesis of Westernizer and Slavophile positions, welcoming Western scientific 
and technological advances, but turning them toward Slavophile goals of communal 
wholeness, unifying activity, and spiritual consensus – all contained in the well-known 
Slavophile concept of sobornost” (Young, 2012, p. 23). Naturally again, this reminds us of 
Lenin’s peculiarly messianic theory of Russia as a “weak link” in the chain of imperialism, 
which therefore would lead humankind into the future paradise of communism.
 Fourthly, Fedorov’s “project” is certainly a deeply totalitarian one. Everything and 
everybody must conform to the project and the holy goal of resurrecting the parents 
and regulating nature. No exception is granted, and no other goal is considered worthy. 
As Michael Hagemeister noted on the Cosmists in general: “the image of humanity 
spreading its ‘noocratic’ rule over the universe, whence it can fulfill the “universal 
cosmic plan” of turning itself into an almighty immortal organism, thus attaining the 
status of God, is an image that quickly reveals its unmistakably totalitarian character. 
Even Fedorov’s world-delivering common task was totalitarian: no one had the right 
to be excluded or forgotten, no one could withdraw from the magnificent project” 
(Hagemeister, 1997, pp. 201–202).
 Finally, in Fedorov’s project we face that peculiar interpretation of the double 
imaginary signification of modernity, which we, again, can easily find in Russian 
communism. This interpretation is heavily concentrated on absolute mastery, on 
control and regulation, re-interpreting thus autonomy through this mastery, and not 
vice versa. For Fedorov, total regulation of nature is a pre-requisite for obtaining 
true autonomy. Only those who work for the common task can be called free and 
autonomous, while all others are just slaves of the blind nature. Fedorov, thus, values 
only positive freedom, and not negative liberal freedom.
 His freedom is based rather on collective than on individual autonomy. Negatively 
defined individual autonomy (freedom from the limitations) consists in arbitrariness. 
One of the main questions for the modernity here would be then how to ensure socially 
positive results of the independent realization of the multiple individual wills. Or, as 
Peter Wagner explains, “one does need to recognize that the idea of collective self-
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determination contains within itself a tension between a continuous free expression of 
the will of all, on the one side, and, on the other, the formation of general will, to use 
Rousseau’s words, and the transformation of the latter into effectively behavior-orienting 
rules and institutions” (Wagner, 2016, pp. 72–73). Fedorov provides a totalitarian 
answer; according to his faithful follower, N.P. Peterson, he thought that “so-called great 
principles of the great French Revolution – freedom, equality, and brotherhood – are the 
product of extremely shallow thought, or even of thoughtlessness, since brotherhood 
cannot result from freedom to fulfil one’s whims or from the envious desire for equality; 
only brotherhood leads to freedom, for brothers who love one another will not envy one 
brother who is elevated above others… For that reason, we must seek brotherhood 
first, and not put it in the tail, after freedom and equality” (Peterson, 1912, pp. 88–89). 
 The image of the human race mastering both outer and inner worlds, both 
external space and internal nature, both planets and society, turned out to be very 
relevant for twentieth century Russia. In its attempts to overcome the fateful split 
between the intelligentsia and the people, Russian society of this time came to 
value control more than individual freedom from interference. It is not surprising, 
then, that Fedorov’s ideas found wide reception and influenced not only such 
strange communist projects as preserving Lenin’s body in his mausoleum or the 
project of turning back the Northern rivers’ streams, of which some Soviet officials 
and scientists dreamed for more than 20 years, but also the plot of Dostoyevskiy’s 
famous Brothers Karamazov novel, futurist poetry of V. Mayakovskiy and 
V. Khlebnikov, as well as the quite successful Soviet space exploration projects.
 Thus, in Fedorov we see the main principles, which have been both further 
developed in the Soviet Russia, and, at the same time, determined the trajectory 
Russian modernity took in XX century. These ideas include such general principles as 
primacy of the mastery over autonomy, or dominance of the collective autonomy over 
individual one, but also such peculiar things as unification of religion and science (which 
in later Russia took the form of religious worshipping of the science) or totalitarianism 
with its radical emphasis on solidarity and brotherhood.
 On the one hand, some of these principles correspond rather to genus temporis, 
to the path European modernity took after the fin de siècle. The cultural, social 
and political cataclysms of this period brought about what Peter Wagner called 
“organized modernity”, based upon “…the cultural reign of a strong conception 
of society” (Wagner, 1994, p. 86). However, “the organization of modernity was 
much more radical under socialism than in the West… In all respects, we can see 
socialism as precisely the epitome of organized modernity…” (Wagner, 1994, p. 101). 
On the other hand, we demonstrated how these ideas and principles (especially 
those, which defined peculiarities of the Russian trajectory) were based upon the 
previous experiences with modernity, in particular the experience of intelligentsia – 
people divide as well as upon the conceptualizations and interpretations of these 
experiences, in particular the discussions on the relations between Orthodoxy and 
rational science. Fedorov’s Philosophy of the Common Task reveals this complex 
set of the entangled interpretations in their most radical forms and thus represents 
one of the best cases for the studies of the modernity crisis of Russian fin de siècle.
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A new fin de siècle: a Russian quest in the context of global challenges
“Dismantling of the conventions of organized modernity” (Wagner, 2016, p. 116) 
started in the 1960s – 1970s in the West, but in the countries of the former Soviet 
Union it coincided with the final decade of the century. For Russia, this dismantling was 
again rather painful, although, unlike previous fin de siècle, it happened without major 
bloodsheds of the revolution and civil war. Collapse of Soviet Union and demolition of 
the Berlin Wall are the events, the real meaning of which is still very difficult to appreciate 
fully. For some short time it even seemed that the era of large social transformations 
and political cataclysms is over, which consideration enabled some social theorists to 
fantasize about a putative end of history (Fukuyama, 1992). Soon enough, however, 
Fukuyama’s optimism has been substituted with Huntington’s dark prophecies and 
looking forward to the ending of history gave way to expecting the clashes of civilizations 
(Huntington, 1996). A brief period of the hopes for the united Europe from Lisbon to 
Vladivostok was forced out by the new cold war era devoid, though, of an iron curtain.
 Dismantling of the organized modernity in Russia led to the experiences, which 
partly defined its being in antiphase to the conditions of Global North and which brought 
it closer to the post-colonial countries of Global South. The reinterpretation started with 
comprehensive critique of rationality, and, in particular, of its capacity to master nature 
and society. This quickly led to the emancipation of various religious and pseudo-
religious beliefs and, at the same time, to the crisis of the organized science.
 The changes were so fast that Russia was not able to develop institutions capable 
of ensuring socially positive outcome of the exercise of different individual wills, in other 
words, the democratic instruments of the formation of la volonte generale out of the simple 
sum of individual wills and wishes. Fast emancipation of the individual in this situation 
brought about a short, but very painful period of social degradation and chaos. These 
shocking experiences led to a suspicion about possibility of handling society of atomized 
individuals and to an attempt of another re-emphasizing of the collective agency.
 However, by this time the Russian society has already significantly changed. In 
reality, it does consist of more or less atomized individuals with very limited solidarity 
between them. The attempts of the government to employ old nation-building 
mechanisms (such as special memory politics, mobilization of the society against 
putative or real threats or even quest for the “spiritual bonds” inside Russian Orthodoxy) 
work only with some groups, whose influence is gradually diminishing.
 At the same time, two things are still very influential. The first is a fear of chaos 
experienced by the population in 1990s. This experience, however, is gradually losing 
its relevance with the lapse of time since for the younger generation the chaos was 
not part of its personal history. The second is almost post-colonial obsession with 
sovereignty. This obsession seems to be a reaction to both Soviet experience, when all 
15 republics had only very limited collective autonomy, and to the humiliating situation 
of the 1990s, when Russia almost lost its sovereignty to the western powers. The 
emphasis on sovereignty, however, is one of the most evident features of emerging 
postcolonial countries. It is this emphasis on self-determination, national interests and 
so one, which today puts Russia in opposition to the Western (or Northern) “developed” 
globalized world and makes it a “natural” member of the Global South.
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 Thus, it is not solidarity or the national pride of the victory in World War II, which 
today defines focusing upon collective autonomy in Russia. The fear of internal chaos 
and assertion of sovereignty are those bonds, which provide otherwise atomized society 
with a kind of collective agency. The obsession with sovereignty, in its turn, leads 
to securitization of the foreign policy. That is why contemporary Russia substituted 
value-politics of Soviet Union, which was based upon some normative considerations 
(internationalism, class solidarity, anti-colonialism etc.) with extreme political realism 
of national interests. Here again Russia is in the antiphase to liberal foreign politics of 
the Western countries. There were many attempts in Russia to reconcile liberal values, 
nationalism, politics of interests, globalization, and general democratic principles. One 
of these efforts was a short-lived concept of the “sovereign democracy”, which at some 
point became quite popular in various circles of Russian establishment.
 Dismantling of the organized modernity in the West led to the weakening of “the 
institutional frames for collective self-determination, partly deliberately in favour of 
supranational or global cooperation and partly because of an alleged escape of socio-
political phenomena from the view and grasp of political institutions” (Wagner, 2016, 
p. 117). In Russia, as we have seen, it resulted in focusing on the sovereignty, rise of 
nationalism, revival of religion and, at the same time, extreme individualization, and 
atomization of the society. One of the main questions for the moment is which of the 
trajectories would fit better the current experiences and which of the interpretations 
can provide them with necessary stability.
 A rather discouraging answer is “neither of the two”. Hegemonic discourse of Global 
North is characterized by what Peter Wagner called the “erasure of space”, when there is 
almost nothing between atomized individual and the globe and when the global politics 
of the liberal powers is suggested to be based upon recognition of the individual rights. 
“Every social phenomenon that stood in between tended to be considered as having 
freedom-limiting effect. Significantly, the notion of democracy, which presupposes 
a specific decision-making collectivity and thus appears to stand necessarily in an 
intermediate position between the individual and the globe, tend to be redefined. Rather 
than referring to a concrete, historically given collectivity, processes of self-determination 
were, on the one side, related to social movements without institutional reference, and 
on the other side, projected on the global level as the coming cosmopolitan democracy” 
(Wagner, 2016, pp. 120–121). Together with an “erasure of time”, which strips human 
beings of any personal history and cultural identity, the erasure of space shapes 
contemporary hegemonic discourse. Wagner calls the image of the free and equal 
individuals entering contract-based associations a “utopia” (Wagner, 2016, p. 121). It 
is utopian in the sense that meaningful democracy does require some boundaries and 
shared historical identities. Completely atomized free and equal individuals will have 
problems with mastering their societies. Diminished ability of the contemporary societies 
to act collectively is compelling evidence in favour of this statement.
 Even if utopian, the erasure of space and time is also very real. In today’s globalized 
and interdependent world the ability of the societies to autonomously determine their 
fate is rather limited. Importantly this ability is radically diminishing if we go from Global 
North to Global South, from politically and economically powerful states to emerging 
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countries and the societies struggling with the consequences of colonialism. The 
decisions taken by, say, the US Federal Reserve System can influence greatly well-
being of an average Russian citizen. The “humanitarian intervention” wars, waged 
almost unilaterally by the USA, say, against Iraq or Libya destroy lives of thousands 
of the human beings. If this is the case, and if neither Russian nor Libyan citizen has 
a right to vote in the US elections, the question is to what extent this world-system is 
democratic and to what extent the human beings living outside of the Global North are 
able to pursue their life-plans autonomously.
 Formal domination of colonial system, when autonomy (freedom) and mastery 
(prosperity) of one part of the world were achieved at the expense of the formal exclusion 
of the other part of the world is now substituted with informal structure of exclusion and 
domination, characteristic for the post-colonial international system. The evidence is a 
recent (grossly exaggerated) scandal with “Russian hackers” and their putative influence 
upon the US elections. On the one hand, the scandal is ignited by the American 
indignation at people, who dared to interfere to “our democracy”, “our freedom”, “our 
autonomy”. On the other hand, it is not clear to what extent in the current situation 
the US citizens can justifiably claim ownership of “their” democracy. Arguably, if the 
influence of the US democracy meaningfully transgresses territorial boundaries of this 
country, the ownership of the polity erodes. Classical system of sovereign nation states 
did not know this conceptual problem, but it formally excluded others through exercise 
of colonial power. Informal postcolonial domination combined with the erasures of time 
and space, however, makes democracy problematic conceptually. Thus, one can just 
wonder whether the hackers’ “interference” was not a legitimate attempt to realize their 
autonomy in the situation when all democratic procedures for them were out of reach.
 To Wagner’s “erasure of time” and “erasure of space” we can also add what is 
possible to call “erasure of meaning”. Namely, with dramatic changes in mass media, 
development of the social networks, blogs and online media, it is increasingly difficult to 
distinguish reliable sources of information from falsified ones. Traditional critical thinking 
skills do not work anymore and publicly available information is getting increasingly 
liable to manipulation. In a way we enter the era of fake news (it is not accidental that 
the term is so popular today) and hybrid warfare (another popular term). Humankind 
is still quite far from mastering the cyberspace with all its strange gods and dangerous 
demons. Real democracy seems to be in danger until this erasure of meaning is 
effectively overcome by a new critical thinking skill adapted to the cyberspace. 
 All these very general observations suggest that democracy today is both in 
danger and in crisis. Human beings should make sense of its real meaning, of its 
proper space with newly laid boundaries, of its relation to “thick” cultural traditions 
and histories. Now, does Russian (Ukrainian, British, American, Catalan etc.) return 
to the traditional nationalism with its nation-building instruments and to the Westphalia 
system of the sovereign nation-states help in the situation? 
 It seems that there is no return anymore, and that humankind has to creatively 
reinterpret the basic concepts and experiences of modernity. The attempts to restore 
conventions of the organized modernity in answer to the current crisis will unfortunately 
lead just to further deterioration of democracy. We witness this deterioration everywhere: 
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in Russia and in Ukraine, in Spain and in Catalonia, in Britain and in the US etc.
 Current fin de siècle has just started and we are still to see what fruits it 
will bring in the nearest future. In Russia, it still definitely awaits its Fedorov 
to express clearly its defining elements along with its inherent contradictions.
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